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Reflection, Intelligibility, and Leibniz’s
Case Against Materialism
Julia Borcherding, New York University
Abstract
Leibniz’s claim that it is possible for us to gain metaphysical knowledge through reflection
on the self has intrigued many commentators, but it has also often been criticized as flawed
or unintelligible. A similar fate has beset Leibniz’s arguments against materialism. In this
paper, I explore one of Leibniz’s lesser-known arguments against materialism from his reply
to Bayle’s new note L (1702), and argue that it provides us with an instance of a Leibnizian
“argument from reflection”. This argument, I further show, does not constitute a flawed
appeal to mere introspection, but is in fact securely grounded in an important corollary of
the Principle of Sufficient Reason: Leibniz’s Principle of Intelligibility.
1. Introduction
While modern commentators have offered different readings of Leibniz’s argumentative
strategy against materialism, nearly all of these readings commit Leibniz to an argument
from ignorance. Leibniz, it is claimed – usually with an eye towards his famous “mill
argument” inMonadology § 17 – infers from the fact that we can find nothing in matter,
however organized, to explain mentality that there could not be such an explanation.1 It
is then pointed out that this is an argument bound to fail, because it, in the words of Paul
Churchland, “simply assumes without question, that the expected failures of perception
will reflect the absence of the target phenomenon rather than the absence of the ability
to recognize them.” (Churchland 1995, 192–193). In this paper, I argue that a little-known
argument against materialism from Leibniz’s reply to Bayle’s new note L (1702) escapes
this objection. Far from being a weak inference to the best explanation, this argument
presents us with a compelling instance of a Leibnizian “argument from reflection”, which
1 See Wilson 1974, Rorty 1979, 26–27, Searle 1983, 267–268, Seager 1991 and Churchland 1995, 191–193, among
others. Unlike the argument I will consider here, the Mill Argument inMon. 17 turns on the notion of perception
simpliciter: “Moreover, we must confess that perception, and what depends upon it, is inexplicable in terms of
mechanical reasons, that is through shapes and motions. If we imagine that there is a machine whose structure
makes it think, sense, and have perceptions, we could conceive it enlarged, keeping the same proportions,
so that we could enter into it, as one enters a mill. Assuming that, when inspecting its interior, we will find
only parts that push one another, and we will never find anything to explain a perception. And so, one should
seek perception in the simple substance and not in the composite or in the machine” (GP 4.609 /PE 215). In
addition to the abbreviations for editions and translations of Leibniz’s text listed in the reference section of
this volume, I will use the following abbreviations for Leibniz’s texts: DM = Discourse on Metaphysics; PNG =
Principles of Nature and Grace, Based on Reason;Mon. = The Principles of Philosophy, or, the Monadology (cited
by paragraph number; quotations generally follow the translation by Ariew and Garber [PE]); New Essays = New
Essays on Human Understanding (cited by book, paragraph, and section number; quotations generally follow
the translation by Remnant and Bennett [NE]).
1. Korrektur/Hrsg. / mentis – PLA 21 satzsonders / 03.09.18 / Seite 45
Reflection, Intelligibility, and Leibniz’s Case Against Materialism 45
moves from an internal reflective experience of ourselves (in this case: an experience of
ourselves as engaging in the action of thought, conscious perception, or reflection) to a
metaphysical conclusion (that we are immaterial substances). I show that the argument,
while seemingly reliant on brute appeals to inexplicability and perceptual immediacy,
finds a solid foundation in a principle Donald Rutherford has termed Leibniz’s “Princi-
ple of Intelligibility” (henceforth: PI), a powerful corollary of the Principle of Sufficient
Reason. (Rutherford 1992)
To an extent, the interpretation I offer in this paper can be viewed as an attempt to
unify two interpretative strands that have been proposed with respect to Leibniz’s stra-
tegy against the materialist: A classic interpretation by Margaret Wilson, who suggests
that Leibniz mainly relies on considerations about unity or simplicity, and two readings
proposed more recently by Marleen Rozemond and Paul Lodge, who both argue that the
notion of action or activity may in fact be central to Leibniz’s argument. (Wilson 1974;
Rozemond 2014; Lodge 2014) Moreover, my discussion expands on the idea, put forward
by both Rozemond and Stewart Duncan, that considerations regarding conceivability or
intelligibility may have an important role to play for Leibniz when it comes to arguing
against the materialist. (Rozemond 2014; Duncan 2011) However, while these interpreta-
tions keep their focus on the mill argument, I will mainly concentrate on the “reflection
argument” that I take Leibniz to provide in his response to Bayle and some related texts.2
My plan is as follows: I first contextualize Leibniz’s argument by briefly outlining the
important function Leibniz attributes to our internal experience in uncovering metaphy-
sical truths. In the first half of the paper, I then go on to provide a detailed reconstruction
of a Leibnizian “reflection argument” against materialism, based on Leibniz’s reply to
Bayle as well as a number of related writings. This argument turns on the claim that we
know from internal experience that we are engaging in thought, conscious perception, or
reflection, and, further, that thoughts, conscious perceptions and reflections are sponta-
neous actions involving a simple awareness.3 These features of thought, however, Leibniz
contends, are inexplicable as modifications of a material substance. In the second half of
the paper, I show that this argument is not a weak inference to the best explanation, but
a compelling argument from conceivability supported by the PI.
2. The Power of Reflection
In § 30 of theMonadology, Leibniz explains how our knowledge of necessary and eternal
truths distinguishes us from animals, and grounds our capacity for abstract reasoning and
reflection.4 This claim about the role of reflection in constituting human reason is familiar
from tradition, and has stirred little controversy among interpreters. However, Leibniz
then goes on to make a further claim, which has caused considerably more puzzlement.
2 For the purposes of this paper, I will bracket the potentially very difficult question whether the mill passage
could or should ultimately be interpreted along the same lines as the texts I discuss here.
3 For the sake of brevity, I will sometimes use “thought” to encompass both reflection and conscious perception.
4 “But it is the knowledge of necessary and eternal truths which distinguishes us from simple animals and gives
us reason and the sciences, lifting us to the knowledge of ourselves and of God. It is this within us which we call
the rational soul or mind,”Mon. § 30 (GP 6.612 /PE 217).
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Our capacity for reflection, he argues, enables us to direct our reflective attention on our
own minds, and in doing so, become acquainted with the nature of substance and other
metaphysical concepts:
It is also through the knowledge of necessary truths and through their abstractions that we rise
to reflective acts, which enable us to think of that which is called “I” and enable us to consider
that this or that is in us. And thus, in thinking of ourselves, we think of being, of substance, of the
simple and of the composite, of the immaterial and of God himself, by conceiving that that which is
limited in us is limitless in him.5
Leibniz emphasizes the power of reflection to unearth metaphysical concepts and truths,
and his commitment to this idea can hardly be doubted. In a note written after 1704,
for example, he asserts that internal experience shows us that we are substances, since
we would not even be acquainted with substance, were it not for “our own intimate
experience when we perceive the self.” (Grua 2.558) Moreover, against Malebranche’s
skeptical stance regarding the scope and certainty of self-knowledge, he argues that
he [Malebranche] has said that we know our soul by an interior feeling of consciousness and
that because of this the knowledge of our soul is more imperfect than that of things, which we
know in God. [. . .] The truth is that we see everything in our souls, and that the knowledge we
have of the soul is very true and correct provided we have paid attention to it; and that it is by
the knowledge we have of the soul that we know being, substance, and even God. (GP 6.578)6
Finally, in a letter to Burnett, Leibniz extends his claims about the power of reflection
even further, arguing that Locke did not sufficiently comprehend that our knowledge of
necessary truths does not depend on the senses “but on the consideration of the nature of
the soul, which is a being, a substance, having unity, identity, action, passion, duration,
etc.” We ought not to be surprised, he continues, that “these ideas and the truths which
depend on them are found in us, although we need reflection to perceive them, and
sometimes need experiences to elicit our reflection or attention.”7
In view of such passages, Nicholas Jolley observes that there is a “marked tendency” in
Leibniz’s writings “to emphasize the knowledge of mind that we have a posteriori through
reflection or introspection.”8 And Margaret Wilson similarly points out that Leibniz at
times writes “as if we could self-evidently experience ourselves as simple or immaterial
5 Mon. § 30 (GP 6.612 /PE 217); see also PNG § 5 (GP 6.600-601); Echantillon de Reflexions sur le II. Livre (GP 5.23):
“It is very true that our perceptions or ideas come either from the exterior senses, or from the internal sense,
which can be called reflection: but this reflection is not limited to the operations alone of the mind, as is stated
(chap. 1, par. 4); it reaches even to the mind itself, and it is in the consciousness of self, that we perceive substance.”
6 See also GP 5.23: “It is very true that our perceptions or ideas come either from the exterior senses, or from the
internal sense, which can be called reflection: but this reflection is not limited to the operations alone of the
mind, as is stated (chap. 1, par. 4); it reaches even to the mind itself, and it is in the consciousness of self, that we
perceive substance.”
7 Leibniz to Thomas Burnet, 26 May 1706 (GP 3.307-308), my italics. Cf. Leibniz to Bierling, ca. 1709 (GP 7.489).
Further passages include: DM 27; DM 34; GP 3.339, 479; GP 4.502; New Essays pref. (GP 5.45); New Essays I.iii.3;
New Essays II.vii.1; Dut. 2.223; PNG § 5;Mon. § 29–30.
8 Jolley 1998, 180. Different aspects of Leibniz’s account of self-knowledge have been examined by McRae 1976;
Brown 1985; Kulstad 1983 and 1991; Schüssler 1992; Cramer 1994; Jolley 1998; Gennaro 1999; Wilson 1999; Bobro
2005; Di Bella 2005, Leduc 2010; Thiel 2011. However, there is no comprehensive, unified study.
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entities.”9 However, she adds, he also “is extremely inexplicit” about how we can move
from our apprehension of the self in conscious perception to warranted conclusions about
our substantial nature. (Wilson 1974, 508) Wilson’s assessment is shared by a number of
other commentators, who then typically display one of two reactions: The first response
(call this the “pessimistic” response) is to assert, as Wilson eventually does, that Leibniz’s
views on the subject are at best incomplete, and at worst incoherent. (Wilson 1999, 379;
Jolley 1998, 173; see also Mackie 1976, 213–214) Moreover, we may wonder whether they
are not at odds with his own critical stance towards a Cartesian epistemology based
on introspective experiences of the self. At least prima facie, it is surprising to find a
philosopher so vehemently critical of Cartesian epistemology for its supposedly naïve
reliance on introspection and psychological criteria of distinctness arguing that some
of the most fundamental notions and truths of metaphysics could be grounded in this
way.10
In contrast with this skeptical attitude, a second line of response (call this the “opti-
mistic” response) to Leibniz’s assertions regarding the power of reflection suggests that
perhaps his views on the matter only seem obscure because we were expecting explanati-
ons where there were never meant to be any. Such commentators typically emphasize the
basic and immediate nature of our apprehension of the self for Leibniz. Robert Sleigh, for
instance, argues that it was “a basic brute intuition of the self” that “told Leibniz [. . . ] that
he is a simple substance”, while Robert McRae explains along very similar lines that for
Leibniz, we simply have a “direct apprehension” of ourselves “as being, as one, as acting”,
and as a consequence acquire the ideas of being, or unity, or action.”11 On such a reading,
the puzzlement experienced Wilson and others is merely due, as Marc Bobro puts the
point, to our expecting “to find something a bit more sophisticated” instead of the very
simple answer Leibniz in fact provides. (Bobro 2005, 30)
Even though I lack the space to fully argue this point here, I believe that neither Wil-
son’s pessimism nor Bobro’s optimism are warranted. To begin with, both the tone of
Leibniz’s remarks on Malebranche’s stance towards self-knowledge as well as the cogniti-
ve language he employs in both theMonadology passage as well in his remarks to Burnet
should make us wary of the optimistic reading. Against Malebranche, he cautions that
reflective knowledge of the soul is “very true and correct provided we have paid attention
to it.” (GP 6.578, my italics) And to Burnet, he writes that it is “the consideration” (la
consideration) of the nature of the soul as we find it in internal experience which fur-
9 Wilson 1974, 508. According to Wilson, Leibniz holds both that “I” denotes a particular substance, and that self-
consciousness can provide us with an original and true understanding of the general nature of substance (of
which we are instances).
10 For some of Leibniz’s various criticisms of Cartesian epistemology, see DSR 57–67; GP 1.369-74; C 94–95, 196–
203; and the writings against Cartesianism collected in GP 4.274-406. On Leibniz’s extensive agreement with
the anti-Cartesianism of French sceptics such as Foucher, Bayle, and Huet, see Popkin 1966. Note, however,
that while there is considerable agreement between Leibniz and the sceptics over the inadequacy of Cartesian
foundationalism (especially where Descartes’ use of the truth-rule and his perceived dogmatic commitment
to our extensive knowledge of certain and necessary truths is concerned) there is considerable disagreement
between them over how to meet the challenge that arise from this critique. For some further discussion, see
Pelletier 2013.
11 Sleigh 1990, 76; McRae 1976, 93–94. Similar interpretations are offered by Brown 1984, Kulstad 1991, 42, Bobro
2005 and Jorgensen 2011, 193–195. Jorgensen, however, also points out that it remains “puzzling” on such an
account how self-knowledge would help us to come by knowledge of metaphysical and necessary truths.
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nishes us with knowledge of substance. This suggests that, in contrast to Malebranche’s
emphasis on “interior feeling”, Leibniz does not conceive of our internal experience as
simple introspection, as the optimist claims. Rather, he appears to view it as the starting
point of a more complex reasoning process which, with the help of additional conside-
rations, both epistemological and metaphysical, can generate metaphysical knowledge.
Indeed, in what follows – now turning our gaze towards the pessimist – I would like to
suggest that a passage in Leibniz’s reply to Bayle’s note L, once fleshed out more fully,
may plausibly be read as an instance of precisely such an “argument from reflection”, and
that this argument can prove far more compelling than the pessimist’s stance would have
us expect.
3. Leibniz’s Reflection Argument Against Materialism
The argument I would like to consider is found in Leibniz’s response to Bayle’s new “Note
L” in the second edition of the Dictionnaire, which Bayle had used to deepen his engage-
ment with Leibniz’s New System (henceforth, using Woolhouse/Franck’s abbreviation:
PB6).12 It occurs as part of a larger discussion of materialism in PB6, by means of which
Leibniz intends to defend his theory of Pre-established Harmony (PH) against Bayle.
Leibniz’s main strategy in PB6 is to proves both “halves” of PH through establishing – first
with a little help from the materialist, and then by refuting her – that there is no causal
interaction between mind and body in either direction.
On the one hand, Leibniz argues, the materialists have successfully shown that bo-
dily movements cannot be explained by appealing to the soul causally acting on the
body, and thereby have established the mind-body direction of PH: They have shown that
“everything happens in the body as if there were no soul.” Indeed, Leibniz emphasizes,
“[n]othing which happens on the outside of man is capable of refuting their [i. e., the
materialist] doctrine.”13 On the other hand, however, they go wrong in asserting that
something material could cause mental states. Thought and perception cannot be ex-
plained on purely material grounds, and this impossibility establishes the body-mind
direction of PH: “that everything happens in the soul as if there were no body.” Nothing
outside of us, Leibniz concedes, may be capable of refuting the materialist who claims
otherwise. However, what is inside of us is. For our internal experience of the “I”, which
12 GP 4.554-71 /NS 107–125. The manuscript of this text was sent to Bayle by Leibniz in 1702, and would eventually
be published in the Histoire critique de la République des lettres of 1716.
13 GP 4.559 /NS 112, translation modified. I shall follow Lodge 2011 in assuming that Leibniz’s arguments against
materialism primarily directed against what Lodge has called “mechanical materialism”, i. e. against a view
that regards, as Lodge puts it, “material things as mechanical systems, i. e., as entities whose behavior can be
accurately and exhaustively explained by adverting to nothing other than the sizes and shapes of impenetrable
particles,” 81. In particular, Leibniz aims to show in the passages under consideration that mechanical mate-
rialism lacks the explanatory resources to account for the possibility of thinking matter, a position that had
been argued for by both Locke and Toland, with both of whom Leibniz engaged extensively. In a letter to Bayle
of 1702 [?] (GP 3.65 ff. /NS 127), Leibniz besides Toland lists Epicurus, Hobbes, and Spinoza as defending the
view that the soul is “a modification of matter.” On the exchange between Leibniz and Toland, see Brown 2002,
Duncan 2012, and Heinemann 1945. On Leibniz’s engagement with Hobbes’ materialism, see Duncan 2010.
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apperceives what happens in the bodily realm, forces us to admit, Leibniz argues, that
the subject of perception must be an indivisible substance:
[I]nternal experience (l’expérience interne) refutes the Epicurean doctrine: This [experience] is
the consciousness within us of this “I” (la conscience qui est en nous, de ce moi) which apperceives
things which happen in the body (qui s’aperçoit des choses qui se passent dans le Corps): And
that perception cannot be explained by shapes and movements, establishes the other half of my
hypothesis, and forces us to recognize an indivisible substance in us, which must itself be the
source of its phenomena.14
Prima facie, this passage seems to lend support to an optimist reading of Leibniz which
holds that – given our powers of introspection – reflection can make us directly aware of
ourselves as unities, or even as immaterial. The optimist thus views Leibniz as arguing
very much like Descartes does when he observes in theMeditations that since I am unable
to distinguish any parts within myself when I consider myself qua res cogitans, my mind
must be indivisible.15 In what follows, however, I will suggest that the argument Leibniz
offers in PB6 is both more intricate and more defensible than the optimist suggests. In
brief, rather than merely asserting that we can in some way directly experience ourselves
as immaterial substances, we should read Leibniz here as claiming that if we assume the
truth of materialism, our internal experience is rendered inexplicable.16
Let us begin by considering more closely the Leibniz’s first and key claim in the passage
from PB6: that “internal experience refutes the Epicurean doctrine.” What exactly is the
internal experience that refutes materialism? And how does it do so? With respect to
the first question, we can begin by observing that the passage characterizes our internal
experience as “the consciousness which is in us of the “I” which apperceives what happens
in the body.” It is tempting to read Leibniz here as appealing to what Kant would later
call the “unity of apperception”, and in fact this is exactly what Margaret Wilson, in her
14 GP 4.559-60 /NS 112, translation modified. Partly because of an ambiguity in the French, it is difficult to deter-
mine how exactly Leibniz intends the first half of the passage (“But besides [. . .] body”) and its second half
(“And that [. . .] phenomena”) to be related. The original French in the Histoire critique de la République des
lettres reads: “[. . . ] l’expérience interne refuse la doctrine Epicuréenne: c’est la conscience qui est en nous de ce
moy qui s’aperçoit des choses qui se passent dans le corps; et la perception ne pouvant estre expliqué par les
figures et les mouvemens [. . .] et nous oblige d’admettre en nous une substance indivisible, qui doit être elle-
même la source de ses phénoménes.” Should la perception here be taken to refer to perception in general, or to
the particular kind of perception Leibniz talks about in the first half of the passage? Compare also the widely
differing translations of Loemker (PPL 578), who reads “la perception” as referring back to “internal experience”,
and Woolhouse/Franks (NS 112), who suggest a more neutral translation similar to the one I have given here.
However, the context of the passage makes it very clear that Leibniz’s argument against the materialist here
does rest on an appeal to internal experience, and that this appeal is what is meant to help establish “the other
half” of PH. The punctuation (which accurately represents the punctuation in the original text) equally suggests
that the two halves are closely connected. It remains an open question, however, how Leibniz would justify this
transition from our reflective experience of thought to “perception” in general. I discuss this difficulty in more
detail in section 3.2 below.
15 “[W]hen I consider the mind, or myself insofar as I am merely a thinking thing, I am unable to distinguish any
parts within myself; I understand myself to be something quite single and complete,” AT VII.86 /CSM 2.59.
16 Indeed, on this reading Leibniz’s argumentative strategy still turns out to bear a family resemblance to a
Cartesian argument, just not in the way the optimist would suppose. For as Rozemond 2014, 9 points out, and as
we will see more clearly in the next section, Leibniz’s strategy against materialism here and elsewhere crucially
depends on a stronger version of Descartes’ claim that modes presuppose the nature of their substance (see e. g.
Principles I.53 [AT VIIIA.25]).
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interpretation of the mill argument ofMon. § 17, has suggested we do (see Wilson 1974).
According to Wilson, Leibniz holds that conscious perceptions are endowed with a parti-
cular unity. In analyzing conscious perception, her Leibniz further argues, we find both
the “true unity” of the perceiving ‘I’, as well as “a manifoldness or variety in object of
content.” (Wilson 1974, 508) Yet material things, being infinitely divisible, cannot give
rise to such a unity.
However, as Wilson herself concedes, this way of reading Leibniz’s argument leaves it
vulnerable to a number of objections. To begin with, as Lodge and Bobro have pointed
out, Wilson’s interpretation renders Leibniz’s argument dependent on a feature of cons-
cious thought, whereas Leibniz regards the representation of a multiplicity in a unity as
constitutive of all perceptions, not just conscious ones. (Lodge/Bobro 1998, 561) Further-
more, this reading seems make Leibniz’s argument vulnerable to Kant’s famous charge
against rationalist psychology in the Paralogisms that this form of argument illicitly infers
an underlying metaphysical unity from the merely phenomenal unity experienced in
consciousness.17 Finally, note that in PB6 Leibniz makes no explicit mention of unity at
all, as we might plausibly expect him to do if this was really the main feature of mentality
he intended the argument to turn on.18
But if it is not the unity involved in consciousness, what then is the relevant feature
of our internal experience that refutes materialism because it “cannot be explained by
shapes and movements”? In order to provide a fuller answer to this question, we need
to look beyond our passage from PB6. Doing so, I will argue, reveals that the relevant
internal experience is the reflective awareness which, for Leibniz, implicitly or explicitly
is involved in all thought. This awareness, I will further show, is in turned characterized
by Leibniz as an internal action that is both spontaneous and simple. A state that has these
features, finally, according to Leibniz is explicable only as a modification of an “indivisible
substance [. . .] which must itself be the source of its phenomena”, thus establishing his
claim at the end of our passage in PB6.
3.1 Reflective Awareness as Internal Action
Apart from PB 6, Leibniz describes both thought and reflection as internal actions in
numerous other writings. In a letter to Sophie Charlotte of the same year (1702), for
instance, he argues that
[t]o say that the self, or what a person conceives through reflection on himself, can come from
sensible things or from the body is something for which there is no probability: supposing
whatever traces, machines, or motions you like in the brain, one will never find the source of
perception or of the reflection on oneself, which is a truly internal action [. . . ] A skeptic who denies
17 This is Kant’s famous criticism of the “Achilles of all dialectical inferences of the pure doctrine of the soul” in
the Paralogisms (KrV A351). Wilson argues that Leibniz’s argument is indeed the main target of the Second
Paralogism (Wilson 1974, 507–513). While engaging Leibniz and Kant on this point is both interesting and
rewarding, I unfortunately lack the space to do so here. Ultimately, I do not think that Leibniz’s argument is
liable to Kant’s criticism (and, moreover, I think there is good reason to suppose that neither did Kant). For a
careful discussion of Kant’s argument and its likely targets, see Dyck 2014, 104–141. For detailed discussions of
the Achilles argument in various philosophers’ writings, see the papers collected in Lennon/Stainton 2008.
18 As I will argue in more detail below, I do think, despite these caveats, that the unity we experience in conscious
thought may well play a role in Leibniz’s argument, just not the one Wilson had in mind.
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that there are bodies cannot be refuted by what the letter says against him; the skeptic will say
that these are only appearances. But he cannot deny that he thinks.19
Just as in the PB6 passage, Leibniz here appeals to our experience of the self, or “what a
person conceives through reflection on himself”, and then proceeds to claim that material
figures or motions could not possibly be “the source of perception or of the reflection on
oneself.” However, he here then also goes on to provide a reason for why we should think
this to be so: Reflection on the self, Leibniz explains, is “a truly internal action.” Moreover,
he adds, this is a result the skeptic cannot deny. The skeptic can doubt the existence of
bodies, but he cannot deny his own internal experience of this internal action: he cannot
deny that he thinks. In the same vein, Leibniz explains to Damaris Masham in a letter
written the following year how our own internal experience of the actions of the soul
establishes PH, since “we have experience of bodies acting on one another according to
mechanical laws, and of souls producing within themselves various internal actions, but
we see no way of conceiving action of the soul on matter, or of matter on the soul, or
anything which corresponds to it.”20
A final piece of evidence in support of this reading of PB6 comes from a second letter
to Bayle, like the first written in 1702 (henceforth: PB7a). In this letter, Leibniz adds some
detail to his characterization of our minds as “indivisible active mirrors” that he had also
used in PB6. The closest analogy to perception or thought that can be found in “visible
things”, Leibniz explains there, is the image we find in a mirror. But, he further points
out, while the mirror is capable of accurately representing the object it mirrors, it cannot
not perceive it.21 And as in the letters to Sophie and Masham, he then again proceeds
to characterize thought as “an action of one thing on itself” that “has no place among
shapes and motions, which could never provide the basis of a truly internal action.”
(GP 3.69 /NS 128) This remark also further clarifies Leibniz’s mirror analogy: Unlike our
soul, the mirror is entirely passive. It does not produce its own image, but merely reflects
something outside of it and thus lacks the capacity for genuine perception, which involves
activity.
In sum, in all the passages surrounding PB6 we have now considered, Leibniz argues
that our reflective experience of ourselves as thinking reveals thought, or the reflective
awareness involved in thought, as a “truly internal action” inexplicable through “shapes
and motions”. Assuming that this is indeed the correct way of interpreting Leibniz’s claim
that our internal experience refutes materialism, a number of further questions now
arise: How should we understand the claim that thought is an internal action? And what
entitles Leibniz to argue that such an internal action is only explicable as the state of
a simple, and thus immaterial substance? Moreover, Marleen Rozemond – pursuing a
similar line of interpretation with respect to the Mill Argument – suggests that while
Leibniz clearly appeals to the notion of an internal action in his attempts to refute the
materialist, the prospects of such an appeal may not be especially bright. Understanding
“internal action” to mean a perceptual state of a substance that is not externally caused by
19 Leibniz to Sophie Charlotte, August – early November 1702 (Strickland [ed]. 2011, 259, my italics).
20 Leibniz to Masham, May 1704 (GP 3.340 /NS 206).
21 “Among visible things there is nothing which more closely approaches thought than the image in a mirror, and
the traces in the brain could not be more exact, but the accuracy of that image does not produce any perception
in the place it is in,” GP 3.69 /NS 128; see also GP 4.558 /NS 110.
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another thing, but generated by the substance itself, Rozemond worries that this notion
may not be of much use in battling the materialist, because it seems to rely on features
deeply embedded in Leibniz’s own system, but not in that of his Epicurean opponent. In
particular, she points out, such an argument may be thought to presuppose PH (which
of course implies that all perceptions are internal actions in this sense), which would be
“philosophically unfortunate.”22
As many of the passages just considered make clear, such reliance on PH would be
philosophically unfortunate indeed. For in them, Leibniz’s is appealing to internal action
precisely to prove PH. Taking the principle of charity to heart, we should thus assume
that Leibniz did not in fact mean to rely on PH to make his argument. But how, then,
should we understand it? In the following sections, I will take a closer look at Leibniz’s
conception of an “internal action”, in the hope that gaining a better understanding of its
features will also provide us with further insight into how Leibniz might justify his claim
that such actions can only be states of an immaterial substance.
3.2 The Spontaneity and Simplicity of Thought
Some further insight into Leibniz’s notion of an internal action can be gleaned from a
passage from On Nature Itself (1698), where Leibniz appeals to the “immanent actions” of
substances in service of his attack on occasionalism.
Indeed, if this view [sc. occasionalism] were extended so far as to eliminate even the immanent
actions of substances, [. . . ] then it would be as distant as it could possibly be from reason. For who
would call into doubt that the mind thinks and wills, that we elicit in ourselves many thoughts
and volitions, and that there is a spontaneity that belongs to us? (GP 4.509-10 /PE 161)
This passage suggests that the internal (or, following scholastic terminology, “immanent”)
actions of a substance are spontaneous actions: They are actions that originate from our
own depth. Instead of relying on features of his own system (such as PH), Leibniz in this
text equally appeals to our “innermost experience” in order to convince us that there truly
are such internal actions, arguing that if this experience of our inner spontaneity were
called into doubt, it would “fly in the face of the testimony of our innermost experience
and consciousness.” (GP 4.509-510 /PE 161)
Moreover, Leibniz use of the scholastic terminology of “immanent action” makes clear
that internal actions are actions in which the agent and the patient are identical, as
opposed to an action in which one thing acts upon another).23 Leibniz also emphasizes
the reflexive nature of thought qua internal action in his earlierDeMundo Praesenti (1684 /
1986), where he explains that “[e]very substance has within it a kind of operation and
this operation is either of the same thing on itself [eiusdem in seipsum], in which case it is
22 Rozemond 2014, 18. Leibniz clearly identifies all perceptions of a substance as actions. See, e. g., “Reflections on
the Souls of Beasts” (GP 7.328-332; also quoted by Rozemond), where he argues that “it is obvious that perception
cannot be deduced from bare matter since it consists in some action. The same thing can be understood about
any type of perception.”
23 According to Aquinas, ST I 54, 2, while a “transient action” is an action which is directed towards a patient
outside the agent, an immanent action is an action that “does not pass outwards, but rather remains within
the agent”, insofar it “takes place entirely in the agent.” Knowing and striving, Aquinas further explains, are
instances of such activities: they take place entirely within the subject, and further perfect it.
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called reflection or thought [reflexio sive cogitatio] and such a substance is spiritual, i. e.
a mind” (A 6.4. 1506-1507). Structurally, reflection and thought are thus internal actions
insofar as they are actions of the mind on itself.
This additional feature is further borne out by the New Essays’ definition of “cons-
ciousness” (conscience, consciosité) as an awareness of the self (sentiment de moi).24 In
thought, Leibniz explains to Arnauld, we consciously experience the representation of
something “divisible and material [. . .] in an indivisible being or substance [. . .] endo-
wed with a true unity.” This experience of the “I”, Leibniz maintains, is constitutive for
thought or conscious perception.25 Thought and reflection, for Leibniz, therefore, are acts
that are always directed towards the thinking, perceiving subject itself, and involve an
awareness of it. We have, as Leibniz explains in our initial passage from PB6, an internal
experience of “the consciousness within us of this “I” (la conscience qui est en nous, de
ce moi), which stands opposed to the multiplicity that forms the intentional object of
its perception when it “apperceives things which happen in the body.”26 In appealing
to our internal experience of thought and reflection as internal actions, Leibniz thus
appeals to our internal experience of a spontaneous action, which involves an awareness
of ourselves as the subjects of this action. Moreover, he asserts that both of these features
of an act of thought or reflection are inexplicable on a materialist account. The question
we are facing now is why that should be so.
24 New Essays II.xxvii (A 6.6.236). For a comprehensive inquiry into the Leibnizian notions of thought and
consciousness see Kulstad 1991 and McRae 1976. In the New Essays alone, Leibniz uses a variety of terms
to express consciousness and self-awareness. In addition to several French expressions for “consciousness”
(conscience, consciosité, conscienciosité), he speaks of “reflection” (New Essays II.xxvii.9), “apperception” (New
Essays II.xxvii.14), and “consciousness or reflection” or “immediate memory” (New Essays II.xxvii.13). Further-
more, some passages suggest that apperception also denotes consciousness of the self, and thus that there is
no distinction between apperception, consciousness and self-awareness (see e. g., New Essays II.xxvii.9, where
Leibniz talks about the “consciousness or the sense of I”). This has led some commentators to conclude that
apperception simply is self-consciousness (Rescher 1979, Cramer 1994, Poser 2008; against this, see McRae 1976,
33 and Thiel 2011, 298). Other interpreters have distinguished between different forms of apperception and
reflection. Schüssler 1992 and Gennaro 1999, for instance, distinguish between two and three kinds of self-
consciousness, respectively, while Kulstad 1991, 148, finds two distinct types of reflection in Leibniz (“simple or
mere” reflection’ and “focused” reflection). A further question that has received much attention in the literature
is whether Leibniz meant to defend a first-order or a higher-order theory of consciousness. The latter has been
suggested by Kulstad 1991, Gennaro 1999, and Simmons 2001, the former by Jorgensen 2009. For a good overview
of these and other interpretative puzzles, see Thiel 2011, 295–301.
25 Leibniz to Arnauld, 9 October 1687 (GP 2.112 /PPL 339). Similarly, Leibniz emphasizes to Burnet that in reflection,
I am not only aware of my mental actions, but also of myself as the mental agent who performs them (Leibniz to
Thomas Burnet, 2 August 1704 [GP 3.299]). Also compare the following passages from the Paris Notes: “In our
mind, there is perception or a sense of itself as of a certain specific thing; this is always in us, because, as often as
we use the name, we at once recognize it,” Jag., 108 /PPL 161–162, my italics.
26 GP 4.559-560 /NS 112. See also Leibniz’s letter to Sophie quoted above, where he identifies “the self, or what a
person conceives through reflection on himself” as what is inexplicable on amaterialist view, as well asMon. § 16
(the paragraph preceding the Mill Argument): “We, ourselves, experience a multiplicity in a simple substance,
when we find that the most trifling thought of which we are conscious involves a variety in the object.” However,
as Duncan 2011 points out, the argumentative aim of this passage from theMonadology is importantly different.
Unlike the passages we are considering, which explicitly appeal to internal experience to refute materialism,
Mon. § 16 addresses all those who – like Leibniz and Bayle – “acknowledge that the soul is a simple substance.”
Leibniz’s point there, Duncan argues, does not seem to refute materialism, but to support his definition of
perception as the representation of a multitude in a simple through arguing that reflection on our perceptual
awareness establishes the possibility of the presence of a multiplicity in a simple subject.
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Let us begin by considering the first feature of thought and reflection: spontaneity.
Why would a state that has this property be inexplicable as the state of something mate-
rial? Drawing on Leibniz’s frequently repeated view that matter is purely passive, a fully
fleshed out Leibnizian argument in support of the incompatibility between matter and
spontaneous thought could run as follows: Thoughts and reflections are clear instances
of states that we ourselves internally produce, and thus are instances of genuine activity.
But matter, as Leibniz frequently asserts, is “devoid of all activity” (New Essays II.xxi.1
[A 6.6.169]). Hence, thoughts and reflections are only explicable as modifications of an
immaterial substance. Besides turning on a claim integral to the defense of Leibniz’s
metaphysics as a whole (the passivity of matter), this reading finds further support in a
recent interpretation of the mill argument proposed by Paul Lodge, who suggests that this
argument also may rely on Leibniz’s claims about the passivity of matter.27 In particular,
Lodge cites a passage from a short text, On the Souls of Men and Beasts, in which Leibniz
first advances the claim that “it is obvious that matter is something merely passive, since
its attributes and variations involve no action”, and then proceeds to argue that “[i]n
the same way, it is obvious that perception cannot be deduced from bare matter since it
consists in some action” (GP 7.328-329 /Strickland [ed.] 2006, 64).
What about the second feature of thought qua internal action, namely our awareness of
ourselves as the subjects of the action? Prima facie, Leibniz’s emphasis on this point seems
to supportWilson’s interpretation of his case against thematerialist. Recall that according
to Wilson, Leibniz appeals to the unity of the perceiving “I” to infer the existence of an
underlying immaterial substance, and thereby becomes liable to Kant’s famous criticism
in the Paralogisms. However, as I believe an intriguing text from Leibniz’s earlier writings
makes clear, his point is in fact a slightly different one. For consider this passage from the
Confession of Nature Against Atheists (1669), in which Leibniz aims to prove that our soul
is immaterial by describing the reflective awareness involved in thought as follows:
For thought is that ‘something, I know not what’ which we perceive when we perceive what we think.
But when, for example, we perceive that we have thought of Titius, we not only perceive that we
have the image of Titius in our mind, for this has parts, of course; such an image is not enough for
thinking. For we have images in the mind even when we do not think of them, but we perceive,
besides, that we have been aware of this image of Titius, and in this awareness of our images itself
we find no parts. For if someone’s action is immediately perceptible, without a perception of
parts, then this certain action is a thing without parts. For a quality immediately perceived in a
thing actually belongs to it. (Confessio Natura Contra Atheistas [GP 4.109 /PPL 113], translation
modified)
Akin to the contrast he draws in his replies to Bayle between genuine thought or per-
ception on the one hand, and a mirror which represents an object by reflecting its image
on the other, Leibniz equally emphasizes in this passage that while thought involves
representation, this representation alone does not suffice to constitute an act of thought.
Rather, when we reflect on our act of thought or perception, we always also experience
an awareness that accompanies this representation. And while the representation itself
has parts, the accompanying awareness which renders it a thought does not. Moreover,
27 See Lodge 2014, esp. 92–97. In addition to this appeal to the passivity of matter, PB7a (GP 3.69 /NS 129) provides
an argument based on the nature of composites: Since the reality of compound beings depends on the existence
simples, so does their ability to change.
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Leibniz adds, since this awareness is an “immediately perceptible” action, we can be
certain that this action is “a thing without parts”, since such reflective experience, being
immediately perceptible, could not deceive.
This passage suggests that what Leibniz is pointing towards when he appeals to our
awareness of the “I” in thought to support his argument against materialism is not so
much our awareness of a simple, unified subject (as Wilson suggests), but the simplicity
and unity of this awareness itself. As Alison Simmons points out, the unity and simplicity
involved in Leibnizian mental representation relies not so much on the idea of cons-
ciousness, as it relies on the idea of a point of view: In corporeal representation, spatially
distinct parts of the representing thing (the mirror) represent spatially distinct parts of
the thing represented (the object reflected), whereas in mental representation, a percei-
ving subject represents a multiplicity of parts as unified into a single point of view.28 It is
this awareness that constitutes this point of view that is said to be simple: We can break
up the complex content of our perception into parts, but not the simple awareness which
unifies this content into a single point of view.
Now, for this second feature of thought qua internal action, there is again a familiar
Leibnizian line of reasoning available which might help us explain why he considers a
state that has this feature inexplicable as the state of a material substance: All there is
in an extended body are externally related parts. However, as Leibniz famously holds,
where there are only external relations, there can be no genuine unity.29 Applying this
line of thought to the case at hand, we thus get the following argument: In thought or
conscious perception, what is represented has parts, but the awareness accompanying
this representation itself is simple, and unifies these parts. But this awareness could not
be accounted for by anything corporeal, because merely externally related parts, like
the parts of an extended body, could never give rise to such a simple, unified state. It
therefore must occur in a substance that is itself a true unity, and thus immaterial.30
Summing up our results so far, we have seen that Leibniz views thoughts as internal
actions, which as such have two features that Leibniz takes to be inexplicable as the states
of a material substance: their spontaneity, and the simplicity of the reflexive awareness in-
volved in them. Moreover, Leibniz argues, we know from reflection on our mental activity
that thoughts truly do have these features, since – as Leibniz asserts in the Confession –
being immediate, our internal experience cannot deceive. It therefore, as Leibniz claims
in our passage from PB6, “refutes the Epicurean doctrine.”
While these results do indeed provide us with the means to fill in the blanks of the
argument Leibniz presents in PB6 in a way that seems well-supported by other passa-
ges, they may also raise the worry that such an interpretation of Leibniz’s “reflection
argument” falls prey to Lodge’s first objection against Wilson’s “unity of consciousness”
28 See Simmons 2001, 42. Leibniz often likens perceiving substances to mathematical points: “Mathematical
points”, he argues in the New System, “are the points of view from which [simple substances] express the
universe, GP 4.483 /PE 142.
29 For further discussion of this point, see Mugnai 1992, 18.
30 In addition, Pauline Phemister (2015, 137 ff.) has argued that both Leibnizian causation and preformation require
a simple (and thus immaterial) soul. Since the entire cause must be preserved in the effect, the organic body
must have a soul which can hold the infinity of impressions this body receives in a single perceptual experience.
Moreover, only an immaterial soul, Phemister argues on behalf of Leibniz, can unify a monad’s past, present
and future states into a single complete representation.
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interpretation. Similar to Wilson’s reading of the mill, the interpretation of PB6 we are
now considering rides on our reflective experience of features of thought or conscious
perception. However, as Lodge points out against Wilson, Leibnizian perception is not re-
stricted to conscious beings, but applies to all monads, and encompasses both conscious
as well as unconscious representation. So, Lodge asks, even if we can show that conscious
perception is inexplicable on material grounds, what warrants the generalization of this
result to perception simpliciter?31 Call this the “generality worry”.
In response, note first that, philosophically speaking, the difficulty posed by the ge-
nerality worry may not be too great. For in order to disprove the materialist claim that
matter could give rise to thought that Leibniz seems primarily concerned with in the
writings we have been considering, it seems entirely sufficient to show that there are
features of thought which could never arise from something material.32 Moreover, in
a number of texts closely related to PB6, Leibniz indeed seems perfectly happy to use
“perception” and “thought” interchangeably.33 This may suggest that, at least in those
texts, Leibniz may, by “perception”, simply just mean “conscious perception” and not
perception in general as in theMonadology and other writings.
However, even if Leibniz did in fact intend his reflection argument to generalize, he
may have some resources at his disposal to ground such a transition. One such way to
bridge the gap is suggested by PB7a, when Leibniz concludes one of his arguments against
the materialist by concluding that “internal changes in simple things are of the same kind
as we observe in thought, and we can say that, in general, perception is the expression
of the multitude in the unity” (GP 3.69 /NS 129) While only our reflective experience of
our act of thought involves a conscious experience of this simplicity and spontaneity,
the same features of internal action that we can observe reflectively in thought are in
fact present in all perceiving substances, down to the lowest monad: Any substance
generates, through its appetite, its own perceptual states – whether these states are
thoughts or unconscious petites perceptions – and any such perception is a representation
of a plurality in a simple.34
Moreover, while Leibniz acknowledges that it is only our own inner experience of
conscious thought that provides us with an instance of this, he then often proceeds to
highlight the crucial role of knowledge gained by analogy, in particular through analogies
grounded in our reflective experience of the self.35What warrants such analogical gene-
31 See Lodge/Bobro 1998, 560–561. Note that when stating the conclusion of the argument in PB6, Leibniz also
speaks not merely of thought, but of perception in general. Moreover, as Rozemond 2014, 13 points out, it is
certainly not obvious why we should think of all perceptions – in particular sense perceptions – as actions.
32 This is different in the case of Wilson’s interpretation, since she offers it as a reading of the mill, which, unlike
the passages I am considering here, only turns on the notion of perception simpliciter. However, nothing seems
to exclude the possibility (and in fact, much seems to suggest it) that Leibniz may pursue several different
strategies against materialism, some of which turn on perception in general, while others turn on notions of
conscious perception or thought.
33 As, for instance, in his discussion at the end of PB7a (GP 3.68-69 /NS 128–129).
34 In a very similar vein, Leibniz writes to Masham that “in this [pre-established harmony] I am doing nomore than
attributing to souls and bodies always and everywhere what we experience in them whenever the experience is
distinct, that is to say, mechanical laws to bodies, and internal actions to souls,” Leibniz to Masham,May 1704
(GP 3.340 /NS 206). For further discussion of this passage, and of some of the various challenges Leibniz might
face because of his commitment to such uniformity, see Duncan 2010.
35 See, e. g., Leibniz to Arnauld, 28 Nov. /8 Dec. 1686 (GP 2.76-77); DM 12 (GP 4.436); GP 4.479; C 522 f.
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ralizations, is a Leibnizian principle sometimes called the “Principle of Uniformity” (PU),
a corollary of the Principle of Plenitude according to which “everywhere and all the time,
everything’s the same as here.”36 In a letter to de Volder, for instance, he uses the PU to
establish his claim that action in bodies “is most intelligible because there is something
in it analogous to what is in us, namely perception and appetite. For the nature of things
is uniform, and our nature cannot differ infinitely from the other simple substances of
which the whole universe consists.”37 In the same way, Leibniz may be able to appeal
to PU to justify his inference from our internal experience of thought to all perceiving
substances.
4. Introspection, Explainability, and the Natural Order of Things
Even with the generality worry out of the way, however, we might still wonder whether
our Leibnizian “argument from reflection” is truly a philosophically satisfying one. Indeed,
Leibniz himself seems to raise a number of worries against similar appeals to internal
experience which, at least prima facie, seem to bear equally on his own. At the same
time, the fact that Leibniz himself points to these difficulties should at the very least
indicate to us that he was aware of them, and should motivate us to search for answers
that he may be able to give in response to them. The goal of this section will be to address
two such objections that strike me as particularly grave ones – the charge of confusing
inexplicability with mere ignorance, and the charge of inviting skepticism about internal
experience.
4.1 Ignorance and Intelligibility
In his Conversations of Philarète and Ariste (1711), Leibniz criticizes Malebranche’s ar-
gument that thoughts could not be states of matter because they lack certain material
properties such as being spatially measurable.38 The materialist, Leibniz argues, could
just respond that the fact that we cannot measure thoughts
is due to our faulty knowledge of them and that if we knew the corpuscles which form thoughts
and their movements that are necessary for that, we would see that thoughts are measurable,
and are the workings of certain subtle machines. (GP 6.587 /PPL 623, translation modified)
Thoughts, Leibniz objects, may in fact turn out to bemeasurable – wemerely did not know
enough about them to realize this, and thus were unable to attribute such a property to
36 As Leibniz points out to Sophie Charlotte (Leibniz to Sophie Charlotte, May 8, 1704 [GP 3.343]) he adapted this
phrase from Fatouville’s Arlequin, empereur dans la lune. See Phemister 2004 for this reference and further
discussion of the grounds of the PU, as well as of its role in justifying analogical inferences
37 Leibniz to de Volder, 30 June 1704 (GP 2.270 /PPL 537); see Leibniz to Wagner, 4 June 1710 (GP 7.530), for a parallel
passage. Similarly, Leibniz explains to Masham that his whole theory “comes down to recognizing in substances
beyond our sight and observation something parallel to what we see in those which are within our range,”
Leibniz to Masham, May 1704 (GP 3.339 /NS 204).
38 Entretien de Philarète et d’Ariste, suite du premier entretien d’Ariste et de Théodore, ca. 1711 (GP 6.579-594 /PPL
618–628).
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them.39 However, while certainly a plausible criticism of Malebranche’s view, Leibniz’s
objection here raises the worry that his own argument could be subjected to a very similar
critique: Why should it not equally be the case that our inability to explain the features of
our thought qua internal action identified by Leibniz as the states of a material substance
is merely due to our ignorance of how such features could come about?
Indeed, this is precisely what a number of Leibniz’s contemporary commentators have
suggested. William Seager, for instance, comments on our reflection argument in PB6 as
follows:
This sort of argument moves from an epistemological premise to an ontological conclusion, a
direction of argument which is, I think, deeply disturbing. [. . .] If the conditions governing the
creation of some phenomenon exceed the grasp of the human mind, then that phenomenon’s
inexplicability will tell us precisely nothing about its nature. (Seager 1991, 87)40
However, I do not think that we need to share Seager’s distress. To begin with, consider
the following passage from the New Essays (thus written around the same time as PB6),
which also clearly shows that Leibniz is aware of the issue raised by Seager:
I note, indeed, that I recognize that we are not allowed to deny what we do not understand, though I
add that we do have the right to deny (at least in the order of nature) what is absolutely unintelligible
and inexplicable. [ . . . ] I maintain that the conception of creatures is not the measure of God’s
power, but that their conceptivity, or ability to conceive, is the measure of God’s power; everything
in conformity with the natural order can be conceived or understood by some creature. (New Essays
pref. [A 6.6.65], my italics)
Very much like Seager, Leibniz emphasizes in this passage that we are not simply allowed
to deny what we do not understand. However, he then adds, if we find that the phenome-
non in question is genuinely unintelligible and inexplicable, then we are entitled to deny
it. For while the present state of our understanding may not be a measure of God’s power,
our ability to conceive of a phenomenon at all is. The reason for this, Leibniz concludes,
is that “everything in conformity with the natural order can be conceived or understood
by some creature.”41
Why should this be so? Following Leibniz’s fundamental commitment to anti-volun-
tarism, everything that happens within the order of nature must have a reason, and that
39 Leibniz criticizes Descartes’ argument against materialism in the Principles on similar grounds (see Anim-
adversiones (1692) [GP 4.359]). Descartes’ observation that we seem able to imagine that we could be without a
body, but not that we could be without thought, Leibniz argues there, does not suffice to establish the claim
that we could not be corporeal – it merely establishes that we can doubt that we are. We could only establish
the stronger claim if we had knowledge of the soul sufficiently perfect to show that it could not possibly be
corporeal. As long as this is not the case, our present inability to conceive of thoughts as extended could equally
be due to a mere lack of imaginative power or understanding.
40 Like Seager, Wilson 1974 and Searle 1983 notice and criticize Leibniz’s appeal to the inexplicability of perception.
However, since Seager provides by far the most extensive presentation of this criticism, I will mainly focus on
his commentary here.
41 Note that the conception of explanation Leibniz is appealing to in this passage and elsewhere is much stronger
than the conception Seager assumes here. For Leibniz collapses causa and ratio: to truly understand something
or to be able give an explanation of something precisely is to know its true cause. For further discussion of
this point, see Mates 1973, 158–162, and di Bella 2002. However, Leibniz does not in fact commit the category
mistake of confuting objects with propositions, as is suggested by Mates. Rather, he clearly distinguishes the
two orders when declaring their correspondence (see, e. g., New Essays IV.xvii.3, where Leibniz claims that “a
cause in the realm of things corresponds to a reason in the realm of truths”, A 6.6.475).
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reason cannot simply be that God willed it to be so, because God himself was guided in
creation by the intrinsic natures of things.42 Consequently, nature – our created world –
is ordered in such a way that all states or properties of things arise intelligibly from the na-
tures of things they are states of modifications of. “In the order of nature (setting miracles
aside”), Leibniz continues in the same section of the New Essays,
God does not arbitrarily give these or those qualities indifferently to substances; he never gives
them any but those which are natural to them, that is to say, those that can be derived from their
nature as explicable modifications. (New Essays pref. [A 6.6.66])
Leibniz here gives expression to an important principle corollary of the Principle of
Sufficient Reason (PSR), which Don Rutherford has termed the “Principle of Intelligibility”
(PI):
PI We can find no natural truth in a thing which does not arise from the thing as an
explicable modification.43
The PI, Rutherford emphasizes, “defines nature as a system that can be comprehended
by the human mind.” (Rutherford 1995, 240) A world governed by the PI – our world, the
best possible one – is a world in which all phenomena must be intelligible by an appeal
to the natures of things alone. Thus, Leibniz argues, all its phenomena must, at least in
principle, be explicable by us.44 Conversely (very rare occurrences of divine miracles
aside), if a phenomenon cannot be explained by an appeal to the nature of things, it
simply cannot be part of this world.45 Given the PI, therefore, conceivability in fact is a
guide to possibility.
Applied to our reflection argument, the PI provides powerful support for the inference
from our internal experience of certain features of our mental states to the nature of the
substance whose states or modifications they are: In reflection, we saw Leibniz argue,
42 Against Descartes and other voluntarists, Leibniz emphasizes time and time again that God is an intelligent
being like us, whose will is not absolute, but always guided by his supreme wisdom and goodness. In a letter
to Hartsoeker, for instance, Leibniz argues that “God’s will is not a sufficient “why” when it comes to natural
things, if the reasons for willing aren’t found in the object, and means for executing this will which conform
to the order of nature” Leibniz to Hartsoeker, 8 February, 1712 (GP 3.532-33). He also stresses that voluntarist
explanations are not genuine explanations (see, e. g., Leibniz to Clarke, 25 February 1716 [GP 7.364-65]).
43 See also Rutherford’s more formal definition of the PI: “Within the order of nature, for any entity a and any
property F that is truly predicable of a, (i) there is a reason why a is F; (ii) this reason explains a’s being F in
terms of F ’s being an ‘explicable modification’ of the nature of a”, Rutherford 1992, 36. Leibniz also states a
version of the PI in the Specimen Dynamicum (GM 6.244 /PPL 441).
44 Why should human minds in particular receive this privileged status? Besides Leibniz’s strong commitment to
the imago dei doctrine, according to which human minds are superior to all other minds because they are made
in the image of God, Rutherford 1995, 240, points out that for Leibniz, the maximization of pleasure ought to
compel God to create a world that is intelligible to human reason, because it offers the greatest opportunities for
human happiness. This interpretation gains further support through Leibniz’s line of argument in the Discourse
onMetaphysics, which both emphasizes that the happiness of minds is essential to best world, and also connects
this happiness to the indefinite potential of finite minds to acquire knowledge of both God and creation. For
a close analysis of Leibniz’s argument in the Discourse, see Jolley 2004. For further discussion of Leibniz’s
commitment to the imago dei doctrine, see Craig 1987, Jolley 2005 /1990, and Hillman 2010.
45 In spite of this, Leibniz still maintains that there can be genuine miracles in this world, which are in fact
incomprehensible to us. However, in his refutation of occasionalism (see, e. g., PE 82–83), he argues that the
simplicity of God’s ways requires that these be very rare (thus excluding phenomena such as thought), and
hence they do not genuinely seem to threaten the PI.
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we experience our thoughts and conscious perceptions as internal actions, which are
both spontaneous and involve a simple awareness. However, given the nature of matter,
which is both passive and composed of parts, these features of internal action are only
conceivable as originating from a simple, active substance. Given the PI, therefore, in
reflectively recognizing our thoughts to be spontaneous, simple actions, we are entitled
to infer that they must be modifications of immaterial minds.
4.2 Does Immediacy guarantee Veridicality?
Besides his charge against Malebranche of delivering an argument from ignorance, Leib-
niz raises a further criticism that equally may be thought to apply to his own line of
reasoning, this time in his annotations to a treatise entitled Meditations sur la méta-
physique (1678). For upon reading the author’s claim that “I am convinced by an inner
sentiment that all things are in me”, Leibniz underlines the passage and notes:
There! For the first time, one speaks with conviction: And the cause of this conviction is the
inner feeling (sentiment intérieur). But how come these inner feelings are certain? This has to
be explained. I’ve told myself that this is because without such inner feelings, one could not be
certain of anything at all. ‘So be it’, a skeptic would perhaps reply. But I am not of this opinion
and I believe that one can say something more satisfactory.46
The certainty of our internal experience, Leibniz points out, cannot simply be granted.
Rather, we need an argument against the sceptic who may doubt it, and he adds opti-
mistically, “something more satisfactory” can indeed be said here. However, did Leibniz
actually succeed in providing such a justification for the certainty of our internal expe-
rience? Above, we saw Leibniz appeal to the immediacy of our internal experience to
guarantee its veridicality. However, we may well worry whether such an appeal to the
immediacy of our internal experience is really convincing.
I will now show that Leibniz’s claim that the immediacy of our internal reflective
experience warrants its veridicality is equally undergirded by an appeal to the PI. To begin
with, consider Leibniz’s appeal to the PI in the service of immediate inner experience in
the following passage from the New Essays:
We can be deceived by memory across an interval – one often experiences this and one can
conceive of a natural cause for such an error. But present or immediate memory (souvenir), the
memory of what was taking place immediately before – or in other words, the consciousness or
reflection which accompanies inner activity – cannot naturally [naturellement] deceive [tromper]
us. [ . . . ] I have already said that there can be an intelligible reason for the element of error in
perceptions which are mediate and outer, but with regard to immediate inner ones such a reason
could not be found except by having recourse to God’s omnipotence. (New Essays, II.xxvii.13 [A
6.6.238])
Reflection, Leibniz asserts in this passage, is a form of memory. However, unlike other
forms of short-term or long-term memory, it is “a present or immediate memory”: it
46 Robinet 1955, 112–113. Leibniz believed this work to be by Malebranche; however, it was in fact authored by the
Abbé de Lanion.
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directly refers back to an immediately prior cognitive state. And as such, he concludes, it
cannot naturally deceive.
Let us start by investigating Leibniz’s first claim, that reflection is immediate memory
(souvenir).47 According to Leibniz, given that my reflection and its object are acts with
different intentional contents, they must also constitute numerically different acts.48Mo-
reover, the object of a reflective act is always what is immediately past. Reflection, Leibniz
concludes, thus is a special form of memory.49 As Ezio Vailati points out, for Leibniz, the
main difference between a memory that is a reflection and an ordinary memory of a past
event appears to be a causal one: In the case of reflection, the perception that is the object
of the reflexive act is the immediate cause of this act. In the case of mediated memory, by
contrast, the perception that is the direct cause of my memory is not the original percep-
tion, but a new perception with the same or similar representational content (depending
on the distinctness with which I remember). Within a Leibnizian framework, reflection
thus turns out to be immediate in two ways. First, reflection is immediate insofar as it is
direct: Unlike ordinary memory, in reflection no mediating entities come between the
reflective act and the perception that is its direct cause. Moreover, given this immediate
causation, reflection also turns out to to be immediate temporally, since on Leibniz’s
relational view of time, the causal order of perceptual states fixes their temporal order.
Note, however, that Leibniz’s claim that reflection is a form of memory does not preclude
the possibility that a reflection can take place while the perceptual state that is its object
still remains (as indeed often will be the case). It only requires that this reflection always
be a moment behind.50
Moving on to Leibniz’s second claim in the New Essays passage – that this immedia-
cy guarantees veridicality – we can begin by observing that it is not unique to the New
Essays, but is paralleled in a passage from On the Method of Distinguishing Real from Ima-
ginary Phenomena. In this intriguing text, Leibniz explains that there are two first truths
of fact, which can be judged “without proof, from a simple perception or experience”: the
existence of myself, “who am thinking of a variety of things”, and “the varied phenomena
or appearances which exist in my mind.”51 As in New Essays passage, Leibniz here argues
47 To the best of my knowledge, Leibniz never provides an explicit argument for this claim, but see Vailati 1987 for
a more detailed investigation into how such an argument might run.
48 My perception of a color, for instance, is of that color only, while my reflection on this perception also involves
an awareness of myself as the perceiving subject: “This thought of myself, who perceives sensible objects, and
of my own action which results from it, adds something to the object of sense. To think of some color and to
consider that I think of it – these two thoughts are very different, just as much of color itself differs from the ego
which thinks of it,” OnWhat Is Independent of Sense and Matter, 1702 (GP 6.502). Compare also the following
passage from the Paris Notes: “In our mind there is perception or a sense of itself as a certain specific thing [. . . ]
As often as we will, we recognize that we perceive our thoughts, that is, that we have thought a little earlier.
Therefore, intellectual memory consists not in what we sense but in that we sense – that we are those who
sense”, Jag. 99 /PPL 251–2.
49 McRae 1976, 44–45, also speaks of the “the essential pastness” of the object of reflection.
50 For further discussion, see Vailati 1987, 251–253.
51 De modo distinguendi phaenomena realia ab imaginaris, date uncertain, ca. 1683–1685 /6 (A 6.4. 1500 /PPL 363).
As Leibniz explains in his comments on Descartes’ cogito, there are “as many primary truths of fact as there are
immediate perceptions, or if I may say so, consciousnesses.” However, “since I am conscious not only of myself
thinking but also of my thoughts, the first truths of fact can be reduced to two fundamental truths: ‘I think’,
and ‘Various things are thought by me’”. Animadversiones (GP 4.357 /PPL 385); cf. New Essays IV.ii.1. Leibniz
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that these reflective judgments could not fail to be true, because their immediacy gua-
rantees their veridicality: “Since both of these namely are perceived immediately by the
mind without the intervention of anything else, they can be accepted without question.” (A
6.4. 1500 /PPL 363)
The New Essays passage, however, goes beyond this earlier text by providing a further,
deeper explanation as to why immediacy should guarantee veridicality: Since reflection
is immediate memory, it cannot “naturally” deceive. While there can be “an intelligible
reason for the element of error” in external perception, with respect to inner, immediate
perception, no such reason is conceivable within the natural order. Rather, error in im-
mediate perception would be explicable only “by having recourse to God’s omnipotence.”
However, such an appeal to divine intervention is precisely what is blocked by the PI.
For the PI requires that everything that occurs within the natural order must arise from
created beings within that order as an explicable modification. But, Leibniz now argues,
given that reflection is immediate memory, no such natural source of error can be found.
Taking into account this appeal to the intelligibility of the order of nature, we thus ar-
rive at the following Leibnizian argument for the veridicality of immediate experience
within the natural order: Reflection, the argument begins, is immediate memory. Given
this immediacy, the only possible source of error in reflection is a divine intervention.
However, God’s absolute power is outside the order of nature. Within the natural order,
the PI holds, which demands an intelligible reason for error. However, absent divine om-
nipotence, no such reason is conceivable. Reflection, the argument concludes, therefore
cannot naturally deceive.
If successful, this argument would help answer the skeptical challenge raised by Leib-
niz himself and lend support to his claim that our internal experience of thought as a
simple action is veridical, as he had claimed in the Confession.52 Now, clearly, much of its
success hinges on the plausibility of Leibniz’s claim that, unless we appeal to the absolute
power of God, there can be no intelligible natural reason for error in immediate percepti-
on. In both of the passages we just discussed, Leibniz leaves this claim undefended and
instead relies on its intuitive appeal. Provided that it has such appeal, he thereby shifts
the burden of proof to the skeptic: Assuming the skeptic accepts Leibniz’s definition of
reflection as a form of memory (or fails to provide a plausible alternative), the question
Leibniz challenges her to answer is how such immediate memory could go wrong. Or-
dinary memories can fade, can be distorted and can even be fundamentally changed by
also argues that all other truths of fact depend on these first truths of fact or “immediate perceptions”, and,
consequently, that if their immediacy could not guarantee their veridicality, then no truth of fact could ever be
secure knowledge. This “reductio” strategy to ground the veridicality of immediate perception is also present
both in the Confessio and in the New Essays passage discussed above (“[I]f these immediate experiences are
not certain, there will be no truth of fact of which we can be assured,” NE II.xxvii.13; “The cause of error is the
medium, for if an object of perception were the cause of error, it would also be perceived falsely; if the subject
were the cause, it would always perceive falsely”, Confessio, L 113). However, as this attempt at refuting the
skeptic does not seem to me to be a particularly promising one – unless it is backed by a number of additional
and very substantive Leibnizian assumptions – I will leave discussion of it aside for the purposes of this paper.
52 It is worth noting the crucial importance this argument for the veridicality of immediate memory occupies
within Leibniz’s thought, for he not only stakes a substantial part of his case against materialism on its success,
but also the fate of morality as a whole: “Since minds must keep their personality and moral qualities [. . .] it is
necessary for them to preserve in particular a kind of recollection, consciousness or power to know what they
are, upon which depends the whole of their morality”, GP 2.160.
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further experiences. However, it seems decidedly less plausible to suppose that the same
thing could happen to perception that we register before it is fully past, and which thus
forms the immediate cause of our reflective act. If, for instance, I recall last year’s visit to
the Rijksmuseum, the immediate cause of this memory is not my original perception of
The Night Watch, but a new perception with the same or similar representational content.
But suppose I did, there and then, standing in the museum, reflect on my act of perceiving
Rembrandt’s painting. In this case, my original perception of The Night Watch itself is at
least a partial cause of the immediate memory that is my reflection (its other cause being
the act of my will directing my attention towards the act itself, rather than merely to its
content). While in ordinary memory, the reproduced perception itself could be a cause of
error, the same does not seem to hold true of reflection, since it does not involve a new
representation of the perception in question, but rather the original perception, which is
now both immediate cause and immediate object of my reflection. Leibniz’s argument
thus challenges the skeptic to explain what could cause reflection to go awry, given that
it is immediate in this sense. If natural error in immediate perception is supposed to be
possible, then, according to PI, its coming about has to be conceivable by appealing to
the natural order of things alone. But what in this order would explain it?
Despite some initial promise, however, this second attempt to invoke the PI ultimately
turns out to be less convincing than the first. On the one hand, Leibniz’s strategy to
ground our knowledge from internal experience certainly goes beyond a brute appeal to
immediacy, and thus lends further strength to his reflection argument. But on the other,
it also seems that a sceptic may have some answers to the challenge Leibniz raises for her.
To start with, a Humean sceptic may argue that the simplicity I seem to be aware of
in reflection is merely apparent, and indeed masks a deep complexity. She may grant to
Leibniz that immediacy does guarantee the veridicality of my perception. However, she
then further points out, all this means is that I can be certain that I am indeed having
the states that I am subjectively aware of having, as they appear to me. We cannot be
mistaken about the fact that we are thinking, nor can we bemistaken about how our act of
thinking appears to us. But this, she argues, does not seem enough. For it still leaves open
the possibility that while our thoughts appear to us to have such and such a feature (say,
simplicity) they in fact may not have those features at all. Leibniz himself, she points out,
often notes that our perceptions of sensible qualities such as colors seem simple to us, but
are in fact infinitely complex.53 And couldn’t we say the same of my reflective experience
of a thought? Even if there is no intermediate state between the perception that is my
reflection, and the state it is directed towards, could it not be the case that even though
this state appears to be simple, it is in fact highly complex? There are no mediating states
53 Against Locke, who argues that the idea of a color is a simple idea representing the power that caused it, Leibniz
argues that “these sensible ideas appear simple because they are confused and thus do not provide the mind
with any way of making discriminations within what they contain [. . .] It is obvious that green, for instance,
comes from amixture of blue and yellow; which makes it credible that the idea of green is composed of the ideas
of those two colours, although the idea of green appears to us as simple as that of blue, or as that of warmth.
So these ideas of blue and of warmth should also be regarded as simple only in appearance [. . .] we should
undertake the analysis of them by means of further experiments, and by means of reason”, New Essays II.ii.1 (A
6.6.120). For further discussion of Leibniz’s analysis of color perception, see Pearce 2016 and Puryear 2011.
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here, nor is there an appeal to God’s absolute power, but – at least on the face of it – the
immediacy of reflection here still does not seem to warrant its veridicality.54
Moreover, the sceptic may further point out, even if we should grant Leibniz’s con-
tention that reflection’s immediacy to its object excludes the possibility of error, we are
still left with the worry that our reflective acts themselves may be flawed. We could, for
example, be unfocused or sleepy, or distracted by external stimuli. In such cases, even
though our access to the object of reflection is direct and unmediated, mistakes, it seems,
could still arise. One possible way for Leibniz to meet this challenge might be through an
appeal to his further definition of reflection as “nothing but attention to what is within
us.”55 Unlike mere conscious awareness, which may arise gradually out of unconscious
perception when enough petites perceptions group together to draw our attention, Leib-
niz considers reflective awareness as a form of consciously directed attention, with the
specific aim of examining its object.56 Pointing to this conception of reflection as focused
attention, Leibniz could then argue that cases of erroneous awareness due to sleepiness
or inattentiveness ought not to be counted as instances of reflection in the first place,
because they simply do not involve the requisite attention. However, it seems that more
would need to be said in defense of such a definition.57
In sum, while Leibniz’s second appeal to the PI certainly lends a more solid foundation
to Leibniz’s claim that the immediacy of our internal reflective experience implies its
veridicality, this appeal may ultimately not be sufficient. Leibniz’s argument may thus
perhaps most charitably be read as shifting the burden of proof to the skeptic, who
(assuming the truth of PI) will have to suggest another, yet unidentified source of natural
error in reflection, or offer a valid argument for rejecting Leibniz’s definitions of reflection
altogether.
5. Conclusion: The Reflection Argument against Materialism as an
Argument from Conceivability
Having reviewed the important role of the PI in supporting Leibniz’s appeals to our
reflective experience of thought, we are now finally in a position to give a fully fleshed
out reconstruction of Leibniz’s reflection argument against materialism:
54 The case of reflection on our own mental activity seems just like the case of color perception insofar as in both
instances, it appears to be possible for us to be in error not only about the contents of our mental acts, but also
about their structural features. In the case of color perception, the problem is not only that we are inferring
the presence of a uniform color where there isn’t any, but rather that we are mistaken about a salient feature
of our perceptual state itself (namely, its apparent simplicity). And it seems that exactly same may be said
with respect to the (perhaps deceptively) simple awareness involved in each act of thought that, according to
Leibniz, reflection reveals to us.
55 New Essays pref. (A 6.6.51). Conversely, “attention is nothing but reflection” (PPL 113).
56 This aspect of reflection is brought out by Leibniz’s definitions of attention as “as an act of thought (cogitatio)
with the desire of knowing” (C 493) and “a determination of the soul to know something (determinatio animi ad
cogitandum) in preference to other things” (Grua 2.525).
57 Alternatively, Leibniz’s claim about the veridicality of reflection could perhaps be amended to say that awaren-
ess of a perception is veridical if it is (a) causally immediate, and (b) involves undivided attention.
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The Reflection Argument
(P1) We are reflectively aware of ourselves as thinking, or as apperceiving things
that happen in the body. In reflection, we experience ourselves as engaged in
spontaneous, simple actions. (from internal experience)
(P2) Reflection is immediate, and thus veridical. (veridicality argument from PI)
(P3) We therefore know from reflective internal experience that our thoughts and
conscious perceptions are spontaneous, simple actions. (from P1, P2)
(P4) All natural states or actions of a substancemust arise from its nature as explicable
modifications. (PI)
(P5) But spontaneous, simple actions are only explicable as the modifications of
a simple, and thus immaterial substance. (passivity of matter, matter merely
externally related parts)
(C) Therefore, thought and conscious perception must be states of simple, immate-
rial substances. (from P3, P4, P5)
In internal experience, we are reflectively aware of ourselves engaging in thought, cons-
cious perception, or reflection (in case of higher-order reflections). This internal expe-
rience, which we know to be veridical, reveals these states to be spontaneous actions
directed at a representation which has parts, yet themselves consist of an awareness
which is entirely simple. Moreover, according to PI, any phenomenon that is the result
of a natural substance needs to be explicable in terms of the properties or nature of this
substance. However, the argument proceeds, given the passivity of matter, and its consti-
tution of merely externally related parts, internal actions are inexplicable as the actions
of a purely material thing. Therefore, thought cannot be a modification of matter, since
the phenomenon, as we experience it, would then remain unintelligible.
In sum, Seager is right to claim that Leibniz infers from the fact that we are unable to
explain fundamental features of thought that we are immaterial substances. But this does
should not lead us to assume that Leibniz is simply arguing from ignorance. Rather, he
can supply the PI to justify this inference. According to the PI, the properties of things
or natural effects have to be conceivable as intelligible consequences of their nature.
However, a material thing could never give rise to states that have the features, that we,
through our reflective internal experience, know thought and reflection to have. Seager’s
contention that a phenomenon’s inexplicability “will tell us precisely nothing about its
nature” is thus precisely what Leibniz would disagree with. Assuming the veridicality of
our reflective experience of our own mental activity, we are thus warranted in concluding
that our minds cannot be purely material.
Of course, ultimately it must remain an open question whether Leibniz’s argument can
really get us all the way to this conclusion. As we saw in Section 4.2, Leibniz appeal to the
immediacy of reflection remains open to a number of skeptical challenges. Further, while
Leibniz’s solution escapes Seager’s criticism, it of course relies on strong metaphysical
principles that are themselves in need of further justification: The PI, and, ultimately, the
PSR. Such justification ultimately may take the form of a priori considerations regarding
the character of God’s wisdom, which compelled him to create a world which manifests
the rational order expressed by the PI. But whether such considerations can be defended,
1. Korrektur/Hrsg. / mentis – PLA 21 satzsonders / 03.09.18 / Seite 66
66 Julia Borcherding
and whether Leibniz adheres to them throughout his writings, are questions which lie
beyond the scope of this paper.
Even though in the end, all may not be as well as it could be, it has become clear that
criticizing Leibniz’s argument does not merely involve calling into question a mere brute
appeal to intuition, but rather an attack on some of the most fundamental principles of
Leibniz’s system as a whole. Moreover, it is intriguing to see how Leibniz’s reflection ar-
gument, very much in the spirit of classic empiricism, fundamentally relies on experience
to disprove the materialist, while at the same time providing a solid backing for such
reliance by means of a fundamentally rationalist principle. The existence of one such
argument alone is of course far from sufficient to conclusively make the case that this
type of reasoning is indeed what Leibniz had in mind when making his numerous claims
about the epistemic powers of reflection. In order to show this, further investigation
into such arguments in Leibniz’s writings is needed. However, the force of the argument
considered here seems to suggest that such a line of investigation may be a fruitful one
to pursue, and gives us reason to suppose that Leibniz indeed found a promising middle
ground between the optimist’s cheerfulness and the pessimist’s gloom.58
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